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蛮犀加固免费版脱壳

推荐 原创

周杰伦

文章分类加壳脱壳阅读数 : 937阅读时长 : 9分钟

蛮犀加固免费版脱壳

前言

样本只作为脱壳学习的一个样本，样本的内部逻辑并没有仔细分析，且样本较为简单，通用性差。本帖仅作为学习记录，欢迎大家一同交流。

加固效果展示

首先先来官网看一下免费版包括的内容
图片描述
图片描述
图片描述
上传一个Demo用于加固，Demo反编译结果如下
图片描述
加固只针对Dex进行，且对类进行抽取，其效果如下
图片描述
图片描述

简单分析

dex简单分析

首先Shell创建了Application获取程序的起始控制权，之后在attachBaseContext通过Helper类加载manxi.so文件
图片描述
图片描述
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之后的步骤都是在So层进行，所以需要对So层进行分析

So简单分析

字符串解密

So通过ollvm进行混淆，首先我们先通过Qiling模拟执行去除最简单的字符串混淆
首先我们需要提取到init_array所有函数起始地址和结束地址，这里我通过IDAPython进行提取

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import idaapi
import lief
import struct
from pwn import elf, pack, unpack, u64
 
idaapi.msg_clear()
 
elf_raw = elf.ELF( "D:/new/frida-agent-example-main/agent/node_modules/libmanxi_copy.so" )
elf_patch = elf.ELF(
     "D:/new/frida-agent-example-main/agent/node_modules/libmanxi_copy.so"
)
print (elf_raw.entrypoint)
init_array = None
binary = lief.parse(
     "D:/new/frida-agent-example-main/agent/node_modules/libmanxi_copy.so"
)
for sec in binary.sections:
     if sec.name = = ".init_array" :
         init_array = sec
# Read Init_array
funcArray = []
funcArray_Address = []
index = 0
while index < init_array.size:
     offset = u64(elf_raw.read(init_array.virtual_address + index, 8 ))
     funcArray.append(offset)
     index + = 8
funcArray.pop()
 
for func in funcArray:
     function = []
     function.append(func)
     function.append(idaapi.get_func(func).end_ea)
     funcArray_Address.append(function)
print (funcArray_Address)

提取到地址之后即可进行模拟执行，监听内存读写，由于字符串解密函数通过OLLVM进行混淆，所以存在对于状态变量的写入，这会导致对内存写入的Hook产生多余的结果，只需要通过判断偏移是否在.data段或者.rodata段即可判断是否对加密字符串进行写入，过滤掉不需要修改的内容后把解密内存写入文件中即可(如果某个函数不能模拟执行只需要从列表中去除即可)

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import lief
from qiling.os.const import POINTER, UINT, STRING
from qiling import Qiling
from qiling.const import QL_VERBOSE
from qiling.const import QL_INTERCEPT
from qiling import os
from qiling.os.mapper import QlFsMappedObject
import struct
from pwn import elf, pack, unpack, u64
 
soData = lief.parse( "libmanxi.so" )
 
datasec = None
rodatasec = None
for sec in soData.sections:
     if sec.name = = ".data" :
         datasec = sec
     elif sec.name = = ".rodata" :
         rodatasec = sec
 
data_str = ""
elf_patch = elf.ELF(
     "D:/new/frida-agent-example-main/agent/node_modules/libmanxi_copy.so"
)
 
def write_hook(ql: Qiling, access: int , address: int , size: int , value: int ):
     Addr = address - base_addr
     if (
         Addr > = datasec.virtual_address
         and Addr < = datasec.virtual_address + datasec.size
     ) or (
         Addr > = rodatasec.virtual_address
         and Addr < = rodatasec.virtual_address + rodatasec.size
     ):
         # if value >= 32 and value <= 128:
         print (
             f "Write Address: {hex(address-base_addr)} Value:{hex(value)} Size:{hex(size)}"
         )
         if size = = 1 :
             data = ql.pack8(value)
         elif size = = 2 :
             data = ql.pack16(value)
         elif size = = 4 :
             data = ql.pack32(value)
         elif size = = 8 :
             data = ql.pack64(value)
         elf_patch.write(Addr, data)
 
# Read Init_array
funcArray = [
     [ 22616 , 23116 ],
     [ 28832 , 29460 ],
     [ 39664 , 40264 ],
     [ 42856 , 43124 ],
     [ 43932 , 44020 ],
     [ 46660 , 46664 ],
     [ 55196 , 62940 ],
     [ 63672 , 63756 ],
     [ 63756 , 63840 ],
     [ 63840 , 63924 ],
     [ 73424 , 73428 ],
     [ 73516 , 73600 ],
     [ 87628 , 88064 ],
     [ 122504 , 122588 ],
     [ 123876 , 124208 ],
     [ 124208 , 124292 ],
     [ 125200 , 125288 ],
     [ 127652 , 128176 ],
     [ 131420 , 131828 ],
     [ 135164 , 135876 ],
     [ 153412 , 154708 ],
     [ 164120 , 167816 ],
     [ 175060 , 175332 ],
     [ 183120 , 183124 ],
     [ 183124 , 183128 ],
     [ 186856 , 186940 ],
     [ 193592 , 193732 ],
     [ 215616 , 216696 ],
     [ 219564 , 219648 ],
     [ 232264 , 232352 ],
     [ 232920 , 232924 ],
     [ 233080 , 233352 ],
     [ 244248 , 253964 ],
     [ 255484 , 256504 ],
     [ 258116 , 258424 ],
     [ 259408 , 262080 ],
     [ 262080 , 262432 ],
     [ 264236 , 264696 ],
     [ 268872 , 269224 ],
     [ 269688 , 270484 ],
     [ 274292 , 276648 ],
     [ 283864 , 284264 ],
     [ 286580 , 287280 ],
     [ 288384 , 288656 ],
     [ 291236 , 291596 ],
     [ 292296 , 293676 ],
     [ 294012 , 295272 ],
     [ 295272 , 295520 ],
     [ 295976 , 296248 ],
     [ 299480 , 299788 ],
     [ 300236 , 307192 ],
     [ 307500 , 307504 ],
     [ 311600 , 312672 ],
     [ 313304 , 313308 ],
     [ 316048 , 316052 ],
     [ 324380 , 325624 ],
     [ 378800 , 380220 ],
     [ 382004 , 382008 ],
     [ 389160 , 389520 ],
     [ 390088 , 390092 ],
     [ 392360 , 392444 ],
     [ 407960 , 407964 ],
     [ 410060 , 410064 ],
     [ 414476 , 415160 ],
     [ 448668 , 457116 ],
     [ 464888 , 464972 ],
     [ 469092 , 469444 ],
     [ 471132 , 471388 ],
     [ 472156 , 472160 ],
     [ 472180 , 472264 ],
     [ 472512 , 472596 ],
     [ 472596 , 472680 ],
     [ 472680 , 472684 ],
     [ 472684 , 472772 ],
     [ 485160 , 489068 ],
     [ 491672 , 493608 ],
     [ 493608 , 493692 ],
     [ 506756 , 506988 ],
     [ 520552 , 521200 ],
     [ 523132 , 523532 ],
     [ 528344 , 528576 ],
     [ 533168 , 539904 ],
     [ 548616 , 550592 ],
     [ 568596 , 569860 ],
     [ 573168 , 575808 ],
     [ 579536 , 579792 ],
     [ 589616 , 589620 ],
     [ 610480 , 610484 ],
     [ 626444 , 626916 ],
     [ 636500 , 636504 ],
     [ 641936 , 643184 ],
     [ 644460 , 644464 ],
     [ 644816 , 644820 ],
     [ 42852 , 42856 ],
]
 
# # Init Binary File
ql = Qiling(
     [ "D:/new/frida-agent-example-main/agent/node_modules/libmanxi.so" ],
     r "D:/new/rootfs/arm64_android" ,
     verbose = QL_VERBOSE.DISASM,
)
 
base_addr = ql.mem.get_lib_base( "libmanxi.so" )
str = f "Base Address: {hex(base_addr)}"
ql.hook_mem_write(write_hook)
 
for func in funcArray:
     ql.run(func[ 0 ] + base_addr, func[ 1 ] + base_addr - 4 )
elf_patch.save( "aaa.so" )

解密之后就可以看到很多敏感字符串，但实际上该程序没有检测Root、Fart，只在程序启动时对Frida检测，也就是说可通过Attach来进行附加
图片描述
图片描述
图片描述

Frida分析

首先需要绕过启动时的Frida检测，奇怪的是我Hook dlopen和android_dlopen_ext都无法获取到libmanxi.so的加载，但是通过Process.enumerateModules()可以得到so，这也导致了后续难以定位到检测的位置和绕过。于是使用魔改Frida (可绕过检测)
简单Hook了一下程序中的SVC指令，通过Radare2的/adj svc可导出所有SVC指令的地址
图片描述
其中addr是导出的结果，这里只针对openat进行过滤

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function hook_svc() {
     console.log( "=====Hook SVC=====" )
     var base_addr = Module.findBaseAddress( "libmanxi.so" );
 
     addr.forEach( function (svc) {
         var offset = `0x` + svc.offset.toString(16)
         Interceptor.attach(base_addr.add(offset), {
             onEnter: function (args) {
                 if ( this .context.x8 == 0x38) {
                     console.log( "Openat:" + ptr( this .context.x1).readCString())
                 }
             },
             onLeave: function (retval) {
 
             }
         })
     })
}

发现其创建线程不断打开status文件进而查询TracerPID字段
图片描述

开始脱壳

首先尝试Hook LoadMethod进而进行脱壳

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function dump_memory(base, size) {
     Java.perform( function () {
         var currentApplication = Java.use( "android.app.ActivityThread" ).currentApplication();
         var dir = "/data/local/tmp" ;
         var file_path = dir + "/mydump.so" ;
         var file_handle = new File(file_path, "w+" );
         if (file_handle && file_handle != null ) {
             Memory.protect(ptr(base), size, 'rwx' );
             var libso_buffer = ptr(base).readByteArray(size);
             file_handle.write(libso_buffer);
             file_handle.flush();
             file_handle.close();
             console.log( "[dump]:" , file_path);
         }
     });
}
 
var size = 0
var dump_addr = 0
 
function hook_libart() {
     Java.perform( function () {
         var loadMethod = Module.findExportByName( "libart.so" , "_ZN3art11ClassLinker10LoadMethodERKNS_7DexFileERKNS_13ClassAccessor6MethodENS_6HandleINS_6mirror5ClassEEEPNS_9ArtMethodE" )
         var dumped = 0
         Interceptor.attach(loadMethod, {
             onEnter: function (args) {
                 if (dumped == 0) {
                     dump_addr = ptr(args[1].add(8).readPointer())
                     size = args[1].add(16).readInt()
                     dump_memory(dump_addr, size)
                     dumped = 1
                 }
             },
             onLeave: function (retval) {}
         })
     })
}
 
function main() {
     hook_libart()
 
}
setImmediate(main)

然而脱下来的壳依旧只有Shell代码，即便我们通过延迟脱壳(即首先获取DexFile的begin和size，之后通过命令行调用脱壳函数)依旧如此
图片描述
所以尝试别的办法，首先我们知道整体加固的原理是替换ClassLoader来加载原Dex，而Shell Dex尾部恰好存在着大量数据，可以猜测这就是被加密的Dex。由于Shell加载完成之后会将程序控制权归还给原程序，所以我们可以Hook performLaunchActivity，在Activity启动之前获取系统ClassLoader进而得到其加载的Dex文件进行Dump。经过测试，最后一个覆盖的Dex文件为原Dex

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function dump_memory(base, size) {
     Java.perform( function () {
         var currentApplication = Java.use( "android.app.ActivityThread" ).currentApplication();
         var dir = "/data/local/tmp" ;
         var file_path = dir + "/mydump.so" ;
         var file_handle = new File(file_path, "w+" );
         if (file_handle && file_handle != null ) {
             Memory.protect(ptr(base), size, 'rwx' );
             var libso_buffer = ptr(base).readByteArray(size);
             file_handle.write(libso_buffer);
             file_handle.flush();
             file_handle.close();
             console.log( "[dump]:" , file_path);
         }
     });
}
 
function getDexFile() {
     Hook_Invoke()
     Java.perform( function () {
         var ActivityThread = Java.use( "android.app.ActivityThread" )
         ActivityThread[ "performLaunchActivity" ].implementation = function (args) {
             var env = Java.vm.getEnv()
             var classloader = this .mInitialApplication.value.getClassLoader()
             var BaseDexClassLoader = Java.use( "dalvik.system.BaseDexClassLoader" )
             var elementsClass = Java.use( "dalvik.system.DexPathList$Element" )
             classloader = Java.cast(classloader, BaseDexClassLoader)
             var pathList = classloader.pathList.value
             var elements = pathList.dexElements.value
             console.log(elements)
             //console.log(elements.value)
             for ( var i in elements) {
                 var element;
                 try {
                     element = Java.cast(elements[i], elementsClass);
                 } catch (e) {
                     console.log(e)
                 }
                 //之后需要获取DexFile
                 var dexFile = element.dexFile.value
                 //getMethod(dexFile, classloader)
                 var mCookie = dexFile.mCookie.value
                 //$h获取句柄
                 var length = env.getArrayLength(mCookie.$h, 0)
                 //console.log(length)
                 var Array = env.getLongArrayElements(mCookie.$h, 0)
                 //第一个不是DexFile
                 for ( var i = 1; i < length; ++i) {
                     var DexFilePtr = Memory.readPointer(ptr(Array).add(i * 8))
                     var DexFileBegin = ptr(DexFilePtr).add(Process.pointerSize).readPointer()
                     var DexFileSize = ptr(DexFilePtr).add(Process.pointerSize * 2).readU32()
                     console.log(hexdump(DexFileBegin))
                     console.log( "Size => " + DexFileSize.toString(16))
                     dump_memory(DexFileBegin,DexFileSize)
                     //dex_begin = DexFileBegin
                     //dex_size = DexFileSize
                 }
             }
             return this .performLaunchActivity(arguments[0], arguments[1])
         }
     })
}

反编译结果如下，可以发现onCreate的方法内容未被填充
图片描述
图片描述
所以尝试延迟Dump的时机，通过Hook ArtMethod::Invoke来Dump，最终代码如下

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function Hook_Invoke() {
     var InvokeFunc = Module.findExportByName( "libart.so" , "_ZN3art9ArtMethod6InvokeEPNS_6ThreadEPjjPNS_6JValueEPKc" )
     Interceptor.attach(InvokeFunc, {
         onEnter: function (args) {
             console.log(args[1])
             // args[0].add(8).readInt().toString(16) == 0
             console.log( "Method Idx -> " + args[0].add(8).readInt().toString(16) + " " + args[0].add(12).readInt().toString(16))
             dump_memory(dex_begin, dex_size)
             //dump_memory(dex_begin, dex_size)
         },
         onLeave: function (retval) {}
     })
}
var dex_begin = 0
var dex_size = 0
 
function dump_memory(base, size) {
     Java.perform( function () {
         var currentApplication = Java.use( "android.app.ActivityThread" ).currentApplication();
         var dir = "/data/local/tmp" ;
         var file_path = dir + "/mydump.so" ;
         var file_handle = new File(file_path, "w+" );
         if (file_handle && file_handle != null ) {
             Memory.protect(ptr(base), size, 'rwx' );
             var libso_buffer = ptr(base).readByteArray(size);
             file_handle.write(libso_buffer);
             file_handle.flush();
             file_handle.close();
             console.log( "[dump]:" , file_path);
         }
     });
}
 
function getDexFile() {
 
     Hook_Invoke()
     Java.perform( function () {
 
         var ActivityThread = Java.use( "android.app.ActivityThread" )
         ActivityThread[ "performLaunchActivity" ].implementation = function (args) {
             var env = Java.vm.getEnv()
             var classloader = this .mInitialApplication.value.getClassLoader()
             var BaseDexClassLoader = Java.use( "dalvik.system.BaseDexClassLoader" )
             var elementsClass = Java.use( "dalvik.system.DexPathList$Element" )
             classloader = Java.cast(classloader, BaseDexClassLoader)
             var pathList = classloader.pathList.value
             var elements = pathList.dexElements.value
             console.log(elements)
             //console.log(elements.value)
             for ( var i in elements) {
                 var element;
                 try {
                     element = Java.cast(elements[i], elementsClass);
                 } catch (e) {
                     console.log(e)
                 }
                 //之后需要获取DexFile
                 var dexFile = element.dexFile.value
                 //getMethod(dexFile, classloader)
                 var mCookie = dexFile.mCookie.value
                 //$h获取句柄
                 var length = env.getArrayLength(mCookie.$h, 0)
                 //console.log(length)
                 var Array = env.getLongArrayElements(mCookie.$h, 0)
                 //第一个不是DexFile
                 for ( var i = 1; i < length; ++i) {
                     var DexFilePtr = Memory.readPointer(ptr(Array).add(i * 8))
                     var DexFileBegin = ptr(DexFilePtr).add(Process.pointerSize).readPointer()
                     var DexFileSize = ptr(DexFilePtr).add(Process.pointerSize * 2).readU32()
                     console.log(hexdump(DexFileBegin))
                     console.log( "Size => " + DexFileSize.toString(16))
                     dex_begin = DexFileBegin
                     dex_size = DexFileSize
                 }
             }
             return this .performLaunchActivity(arguments[0], arguments[1])
         }
     })
}

反编译效果如下
图片描述



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