前言

之前发了一个 ssl pinning 的文章。里面没有什么案例。最近刚好看到BYD的这个app，在网络请求的过程中使用了 ssl pinning 。且是通过 X509Manager 方式实现的。所以这里就记录下分析过程。另外这个 app 的native 层也是白盒AES 与五菱app一模一样的。

目标信息

版本：770

接口：进入app首页任意接口

是否有壳：bangbang壳

参数：request

参数定位

ssl pinning

打开抓包工具，这个提示就是 app 做了证书绑定。直接上 sslbypass

根据之前的文章 Platform,checkServerTrusted 就是使用 x509 来验证服务器的证书，它调用的就是 app 继承实现了的 x509

所以就是 a.d&1

var x509 = Java.use("com.byd.aeri.core.net.a.d$1");
                    console.log("x509 ",x509)
                    x509['checkServerTrusted'].implementation =function(arg0,arg1){
                        console.log("x509 check");
                        return ;
                    }   

数据就出来了

charles 能看到数据了，请求数据和返回的数据都被加密了。这次的目标就是 request。

request 参数分析

硬邦邦的壳，上次分析wu菱app也是用的邦邦。没啥说的，上老演员 xrt 把它脱了。

演员表演完毕

搜索关键词 request ，没有找到。再换一个方式搜索 “request” 有几个可疑的地方

第一个像是检查长度的，先分析第二个

数据来自 checkCodeUtil.checkcode("F" + a2, 1)

checkcode 就是到native 层了

在 CheckCodeUtils 最下方也找到了对应的 so

hook 来获取传入的参数

目标接口

https://dilinkappserver-cn.byd.auto/club/?s=ForInterfaceApp.forwardInformationFlow&serviceDir=App.Community.TopicList

对应的 request 的参数为

对比之后 frida hook 结果中有我们的目标数据

CheckCodeUtil.checkcode is called: str=F{"encryData":"D4761015BF05FD9400E1440CADB654F398C9DD70EE8838DEE4A6C4093D3894A7B66C09A0927F8FEDA8C15B0F56A6FC6DF1787ACC97228B5894C8DFFD5272752B","orderType":1,"identifier":"club100","reqTimestamp":"1736215765773","imeiMD5":"B17C3F7EEE64C071B136EE850685A81C","sign":"2Ce9D2d38B28AC4f71da48a8BC75A96a8Da3Ddf","numPerPage":5,"identifierType":2,"pageNum":1,"appChannel":"1","status":"3","objective":""}, i=1, str2=1736215765774

CheckCodeUtil.checkcode result=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

参数搞定，接下来基操进入 native 层。

native 分析

IDA 打开 encrypt ，搜索 java 能够找到对应方法，说明是静态注册的。

进入 checkcode 查看发现是没有汇编指令的，猜测应该是 so 加固了。这个时候需要先dump内存中的so。因为内存中的 so 在 app 运行起来之后一定是解密状态的。

function dump_so(so_name) {
    Java.perform(function () {
        var currentApplication = Java.use("android.app.ActivityThread").currentApplication();
        var dir = currentApplication.getApplicationContext().getFilesDir().getPath();
        var libso = Process.getModuleByName(so_name);
        console.log("[name]:", libso.name);
        console.log("[base]:", libso.base);
        console.log("[size]:", ptr(libso.size));
        console.log("[path]:", libso.path);
        var file_path = dir + "/" + libso.name + "_" + libso.base + "_" + ptr(libso.size) + ".so";
        var file_handle = new File(file_path, "wb");
        if (file_handle && file_handle != null) {
            Memory.protect(ptr(libso.base), libso.size, 'rwx');
            var libso_buffer = ptr(libso.base).readByteArray(libso.size);
            file_handle.write(libso_buffer);
            file_handle.flush();
            file_handle.close();
            console.log("[dump]:", file_path);
 
        }
    });
}

dump出来的so信息是不完整的，需要修复 so。使用开源工具 https://github.com/F8LEFT/SoFixer

1	`.\soFixer-Windows-64.exe -s D:\pyworkSpace\frida-code\app\byd\libencrypt.so_0x7026013000_0x1d9000.so -o D:\pyworkSpace\frida-code\app\byd\libencrypt.so_0x7026013000_0x1d9000_fix.so -m 0x7026013000 -d`

使用修复后的 so 导入 unidbg，并补上环境。

public class fbyd extends AbstractJni {
    private AndroidEmulator emulator;
    private VM vm;
    private final Module module;
 
 
    public fbyd() {
        emulator = AndroidEmulatorBuilder.for64Bit()
                .setProcessName("com.byd.aeri.caranywhere")
                .build();
        final Memory memory = emulator.getMemory();
        memory.setLibraryResolver(new AndroidResolver(23));
 
        vm = emulator.createDalvikVM(new File("unidbg-android/src/test/java/com/byd/aeri/caranywhere/byd770.apk"));
        vm.setJni(this);
        vm.setVerbose(true);
        // libandroid.so 用一个虚拟的 so 来代替
        new AndroidModule(emulator, vm).register(memory);
 
        //so 模块
        DalvikModule dm = vm.loadLibrary(new File("unidbg-android/src/test/java/com/byd/aeri/caranywhere/libencrypt.so_0x7026013000_0x1d9000_fix.so"), true);
        module = dm.getModule();
        dm.callJNI_OnLoad(emulator);
 
    }
 
    @Override
    public DvmObject<?> callStaticObjectMethod(BaseVM vm, DvmClass dvmClass, String signature, VarArg varArg) {
        switch (signature) {
            case "android/app/ActivityThread->currentActivityThread()Landroid/app/ActivityThread;":
                return vm.resolveClass("android/app/ActivityThread").newObject(null);
            case "android/os/SystemProperties->get(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;":
                String arg = varArg.getObjectArg(0).getValue().toString();
                System.out.println("SystemProperties get arg===>" + arg);
                if (arg.equals("ro.serialno")) {
                    return new StringObject(vm, "9B131FFBA001Y5");
                }
 
        }
        return super.callStaticObjectMethod(vm, dvmClass, signature, varArg);
    }
 
    @Override
    public DvmObject<?> callObjectMethod(BaseVM vm, DvmObject<?> dvmObject, String signature, VarArg varArg) {
        switch (signature){
            case "android/app/ActivityThread->getSystemContext()Landroid/app/ContextImpl;":
                return vm.resolveClass("android/app/ContextImpl").newObject(null);
            case "android/app/ContextImpl->getPackageManager()Landroid/content/pm/PackageManager;":
                return vm.resolveClass("android/content/pm/PackageManager").newObject(null);
            case "android/app/ContextImpl->getSystemService(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Object;":
                String arg = varArg.getObjectArg(0).getValue().toString();
                System.out.println("getSystemService arg ===> "+arg);
                return vm.resolveClass("android.net.wifi").newObject(signature);
            case "android/net/wifi->getConnectionInfo()Landroid/net/wifi/WifiInfo;":
                return vm.resolveClass("android/net/wifi/WifiInfo").newObject(null);
            case "android/net/wifi/WifiInfo->getMacAddress()Ljava/lang/String;":
                return new StringObject(vm, "02:00:00:00:00:00");
 
        }
        return super.callObjectMethod(vm, dvmObject, signature, varArg);
    }
 
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        fbyd b = new fbyd();
    }
}

来个主动调用

    private void call_native(){
//        253AC Java_com_bangcle_comapiprotect_CheckCodeUtil_checkcode
        List<Object> args = new ArrayList<>();
        args.add(vm.getJNIEnv());
        args.add(0);
        String arg1 = "F{\"encryData\":\"5D8B849FC54256C755A5B15BB96F7E9F0BE482FA77C91EF02960172AC72B4FFD\",\"identifier\":\"club100\",\"reqTimestamp\":\"1736215765786\",\"imeiMD5\":\"B17C3F7EEE64C071B136EE850685A81C\",\"sign\":\"E4f996d9FC2eAEb460aeFCf4DC8eB732CC95E539\",\"numPerPage\":10,\"identifierType\":2,\"pageNum\":0,\"appChannel\":\"1\",\"objective\":\"\"}";
        int arg2 = 1;
        String tm = "1736215765788";
 
        args.add(vm.addLocalObject(new StringObject(vm,arg1)));
        args.add(arg2);
        args.add(vm.addLocalObject(new StringObject(vm,tm)));
        Number retNum = module.callFunction(emulator,0x253AC,args.toArray());
        StringObject ret = vm.getObject(retNum.intValue());
        System.out.println("md5result:" + ret);     
    }

得到的结果

md5result: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

和抓包的一致。然后接着分析 so 算法

so 算法起始和五菱那篇的 AES DFA 一模一样的。可以转去看那篇文章哈。

okhttp 证书绑定流程 ssl pinning分析

五菱AES DFA。如今弯道今犹在，不见当年过弯人

总结

算上水了一篇文章吧，主要是学习怎么过 ssl pinning 。多谢各位大佬的时间啦！！

最后于 5小时前被绿豆粥编辑，原因：改标题

更多【Android安全-sslpinning案例，byd验证服务端证书+白盒AES DFA】相关视频教程：www.yxfzedu.com

Android安全-sslpinning案例，byd验证服务端证书+白盒AES DFA

前言

目标信息

参数定位

ssl pinning

request 参数分析

native 分析

总结

相关文章推荐

Markdown Editor

友情链接

课程目录

技术交流QQ群

Android安全-sslpinning案例 ，byd验证服务端证书+白盒AES DFA

前言

目标信息

参数定位

ssl pinning

request 参数分析

native 分析

总结

相关文章推荐

Markdown Editor

友情链接

课程目录

技术交流QQ群

Android安全-sslpinning案例，byd验证服务端证书+白盒AES DFA